Agent Behavior Prediction and Its Generalization Analysis by Tian, Fei et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
49
60
v2
  [
cs
.L
G]
  1
1 J
ul 
20
14
Agent Behavior Prediction and Its Generalization Analysis
Fei Tian∗
University of Science and Technology of China
tianfei@mail.ustc.edu.cn
Haifang Li∗
Chinese Academy of Sciences
lihaifang@amss.ac.cn
Wei Chen
Microsoft Research
wche@microsoft.com
Tao Qin
Microsoft Research
taoqin@microsoft.com
Enhong Chen
University of Science and Technology of China
cheneh@ustc.edu.cn
Tie-Yan Liu
Microsoft Research
tyliu@microsoft.com
Abstract
Machine learning algorithms have been applied to pre-
dict agent behaviors in real-world dynamic systems,
such as advertiser behaviors in sponsored search and
worker behaviors in crowdsourcing. The behavior data
in these systems are generated by live agents: once the
systems change due to the adoption of the prediction
models learnt from the behavior data, agents will ob-
serve and respond to these changes by changing their
own behaviors accordingly. As a result, the behavior
data will evolve and will not be identically and indepen-
dently distributed, posing great challenges to the theo-
retical analysis on the machine learning algorithms for
behavior prediction. To tackle this challenge, in this pa-
per, we propose to use Markov Chain in Random En-
vironments (MCRE) to describe the behavior data, and
perform generalization analysis of the machine learn-
ing algorithms on its basis. Since the one-step transi-
tion probability matrix of MCRE depends on both pre-
vious states and the random environment, conventional
techniques for generalization analysis cannot be di-
rectly applied. To address this issue, we propose a novel
technique that transforms the original MCRE into a
higher-dimensional time-homogeneous Markov chain.
The new Markov chain involves more variables but is
more regular, and thus easier to deal with. We prove the
convergence of the new Markov chain when time ap-
proaches infinity. Then we prove a generalization bound
for the machine learning algorithms on the behavior
data generated by the new Markov chain, which de-
pends on both the Markovian parameters and the cov-
ering number of the function class compounded by the
loss function for behavior prediction and the behavior
prediction model. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work that performs the generalization analysis
on data generated by complex processes in real-world
dynamic systems.
1 Introduction
In this Internet era, more and more data are generated by
self-interested agents in interactive systems. For example,
in sponsored search, advertisers generate a large volume of
∗This work was done when the first two authors were visiting
Microsoft Research Asia.
bidding log data in their daily competitions with each other
in attracting search users to click their ads; in crowdsourc-
ing, workers generate a lot of behavior data when competing
with other workers in getting tasks from the employers, and
when completing the tasks assigned to them.
In many real cases including the aforementioned ones,
there are three kinds of players in the systems: platform,
users, and self-interested agents. Platform is the owner of
the system, who designs the mechanism of the system and
takes care of its execution. Users arrive at the platform in
random, with their particular needs to be fulfilled. Agents
behave strategically in order to attract the attention of the
users so as to realize their own utilities. Taking both user
needs and agent behaviors into consideration, the platform
matches users with agents, extracts revenue from this pro-
cedure, and gives agents feedback on their performances
(which depend on both the behaviors of agents and random-
ness in users). Upon the feedback, agents will adjust their
behaviors in order to be better off in the future. To design a
good mechanism, it is very important for the platform to un-
derstand and predict agent behaviors. With accurate predic-
tion of agent behaviors, the platform can also provide tools
to help agents to optimize their performances and therefore
attract more agents to the system. Thus, predicting agent be-
haviors is an important task for the platform. For ease of
reference, we call the problem of predicting agent behaviors
in an interactive system “agent behavior prediction (ABP)”.
1.1 Examples of ABP
Here we give three concrete examples of ABP for illustra-
tion, including systems of sponsored search, crowdsourcing
and app stores.
In a sponsored search system, platform, users, and
agents correspond to the search engine, search users,
and advertisers respectively. Advertiser behaviors are the
bid prices on their ads. When a search user issues
a query, the search engine will run a GSP auction
(Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz 2005) among all adver-
tisers who bid on the query, rank their ads according to the
product of the bid price and predicted click-through rate,
and then charge the winning advertisers if the user clicks
on their ads. After a period of time, the search engine will
provide feedback to the advertisers about their performances
(which we usually call Key Performance Indicators, or KPIs
for short). The KPIs usually contain the numbers of impres-
sions and clicks, the average rank positions, and the costs
per click of their ads. Many advertisers will adjust their bid
prices based on the feedback they receive, either by them-
selves or with the help of third-party search engine market-
ing companies. By logging the bid prices in a sufficiently
long period of time, the search engine can predict how ad-
vertisers behave, and consequently enhance its click predic-
tion algorithm and auction mechanism.
In crowdsourcing systems, platform, users, and agents
correspond to crowdsourcing platform (e.g., Amazon Me-
chanical Turk), employers, and workers respectively. A
worker’ behaviors usually include the claimed profile and
expertise, the committed available time slots, the minimum
payment requirement, and the quality of fulfilling a task.
When an employer submits his/her task, the crowdsourcing
platform will select workers according to some criteria, and
then dispatch the tasks to them. After the workers finish the
tasks, the employer will pay certain amount of money, part
of which goes to the platform as commission and the rest
goes to the workers. The employer will also rate the quality
of the task completion. After a period of time, the platform
will provide workers with necessary feedback, which usu-
ally includes the number of task assigned to them, the aver-
age ratings they receive, the total payments they obtain, etc.
Some workers will adjust their behaviors based on the feed-
back in hope to be assigned more tasks and to get better rat-
ing/payment. With the logs of the behaviors of the workers,
the platform can predict how workers behave, and enhance
the worker engagement tool and task assignment mechanism
on its basis.
In app stores, platform, users and agents correspond to
app store, app users, and app developers respectively. The
behaviors of the app developers include creating, describ-
ing, upgrading, and pricing their apps. When an app user
searches for apps with certain functionalities, the app store
will recommend a ranked list of related apps according to
their claimed functionalities, popularities, reviews and rat-
ings, prices, etc. The user might choose one or several apps
from the list to install. For paid apps, the user needs to pay
a certain amount of money, part of which goes to the app
store as its commission, and the rest goes to the app devel-
opers. After using these apps, the user may comment on the
quality of the apps by submitting reviews and ratings. After
a period of time, the app store will provide app developers
with feedback, which usually includes the number of users
who view their apps, the number of users who purchase and
install their apps, the average rating and the number of re-
views of their apps, and the total revenue they obtained from
the installations of their apps. Many app developers will up-
grade their apps (e.g., adjust the functionalities, descriptions,
and prices) according to the feedback in hope to get a bet-
ter performance in the future. With the logs of the behaviors
of app developers, the app store can predict how develop-
ers behave and enhance its recommendation algorithm, and
revenue sharing mechanism on its basis.
1.2 Generalization Analysis for ABP
Because of its importance, ABP has been stud-
ied in many works, including (Cary et al. 2007;
Pin and Key. 2011; Zhou and Lukose. 2007; Xu et al. 2013;
He et al. 2013). Some of them (Xu et al. 2013;
He et al. 2013) have adopted machine learning tech-
niques and attempted to learn an agent behavior model
by means of empirical risk minimization (ERM) on the
behavior logs. Empirical results have shown that these
machine learning techniques can significantly outperform
previous non-learning approaches. However, despite the
experimental success, it still remains an open question
whether the use of ERM algorithms in behavior prediction
is theoretically sound, and whether certain generalization
ability of such algorithms can be guaranteed.
As far as we know, the answers to the above questions are
unclear yet. This is mainly because of the complication of
the corresponding theoretical analysis. As aforementioned,
the behavior data are generated by self-interested agents, and
dependent on both their previous behaviors and the random
user factors in the system. As a result, the behavior data have
quite complex statistical properties, and the generalization
analysis in such a setting goes beyond the state of the art
of statistical learning theory (Vapnik 1998; Devroye 1996;
Yu 1994a).
1.3 Related Work
There have been extensive game-theoretic
models on advertisers’ bidding prediction
(Cary et al. 2007)(Chakrabarty, Zhou, and Lukose. 2007)(Zhou and Lukose. 2007).
These models generally assume advertisers are fully rational
and have full information access. This assumption is far
beyond reality and thus recently machine learning methods
(Cui et al. 2011)(Xu et al. 2013)(He et al. 2013), based
on minimizing prediction loss on advertisers’ historical
bidding data, have been employed in this task. For example,
in (Xu et al. 2013), the authors propose models to describe
different levels of advertisers’ rationalities and fit the
model parameters by learning from bidding data. The
work most relevant to ours is (He et al. 2013), in which a
Markov bidding model is introduced and a linear prediction
function is learnt using Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
However, whether these machine learning algorithms enjoy
generalization ability remains an open theoretical problem
since historical behavioral data are non i.i.d.
Previously machine learning researchers have es-
tablished several theories for learning from non i.i.d data
(Yu 1994a)(Vidyasagar 2003)(Mohri and Rostamizadeh 2007).
In (Yu 1994a) and (Zou, Li, and Xu 2009), the authors es-
tablish uniform convergence bounds for stationary process
and strongly mixing sequence. There are also theories
specially built for learning under Markov chains such as
(Zou, Li, and Xu 2009)(Zhang and Tao 2012), however
they are not qualified to answer our question because they
do not cover the case of learning under MCRE, a special
Markov chain with time-variant transition probabilities.
There are also works on MCRE in statistics literature such
as (Cogburn 1980)(Cogburn 1984) and (Cogburn 1991),
but they mainly focus on statistical properties of MCRE
such as ergodicity and central limit theorem. To the best
of our knowledge there has been no previous works on
generalization analysis of learning on data from MCRE.
1.4 Our Results
In order to analyze the ERM algorithms on agent behavior
prediction, we propose a set of new techniques in this paper.
First, we model the generation process of the behav-
ior data using a so-called Markov Chain in Random Envi-
ronments (MCRE), whose transition matrix is time-variant
(depending on the random environments). Take sponsored
search as an example. After the current-round auction, the
advertiser observes his/her KPIs, which depend on both the
bids of all the advertisers and the random clicks of the users.
Based on the KPIs, the advertiser will determine how to set
his/her own bid for the next round of auction and for differ-
ent KPI values, the conditional distribution of his/her bid at
the next round will be different. In this sense, the sequence
of advertiser bids can be regarded as an MCRE.
Second, considering that it is difficult to perform general-
ization analysis on MCRE, we propose an equivalence trans-
formation that maps the original MCRE to a higher dimen-
sional time-homogenous Markov chain. Although the new
Markov chain involves more variables, it is more regular and
thus easier to deal with from the perspective of generaliza-
tion analysis. We prove that the new Markov chain will con-
verge when time approaches infinity and a Hoeffding-style
inequality holds for the empirical process associated with it.
Third, by exploiting the covering number technique, we
derive a uniform convergence bound for the ERM algo-
rithms on the data generated by the new Markov chain (and
thus by the original MCRE due to the equivalence transfor-
mation). As a consequence, we prove that the ERM algo-
rithms on the data generated by MCRE have their theoreti-
cal guarantees, which explains their good empirical perfor-
mances reported in previous work. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first work in the literature that performs for-
mal generalization analysis on the agent behavior prediction
problem.
2 Agent Behavior Prediction
In this section we give a formal description of the Agent
Behavior Prediction (ABP) problem. We first show that the
generation process for the behaviors of self-interested agents
can be described by a Markov Chain in Random Environ-
ments (MCRE), and then formulate ABP as an optimization
problem.
2.1 Agent Behaviors: Markov Chain in Random
Environments
The dynamic interactive systems mentioned in the introduc-
tion share some common properties. (1) The behaviors of
an agent only depend on a finite number of his/her histor-
ical actions due to the limited memory of human being.
In other words, the behaviors have Markovian properties.
(2)Random users behaviors are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d), for example, in sponsor search, there are
two aspects associated with users: queries issued by users,
and users click patterns on ad ranking lists. It is clear that
queries can be regarded as i.i.d. random variables. Click pat-
terns are defined with respect to all possible ad ranking lists
and they are also independent of agent behaviors(which only
determine the selected ranking list), and can be regarded as
i.i.d. (3) The behavior change of an agent is mainly affected
by the feedback given by the platform. Since the feedback
depends on the users randomly arriving at the system, the
behavior change is not governed by a constant rule, but in-
stead by some random factors.
Taking all the three properties into consideration, we can
regard agent behaviors as generated by a Markov Chain in
Random Environments (MCRE)(Cogburn 1980). Note that
this generation process is much more complicated than
a simple i.i.d. sampling process or a time-homogeneous
Markov process.
Before formally describing the MCRE process for agent
behaviors, we make some assumptions. First, we assume
that both the behavior space and feedback space are fi-
nite. This assumption is reasonable, since in many appli-
cations the behaviors of the agents are either characterized
by categorical profiles (e.g., expertise and functionalities) or
bounded and associated with a minimum unit (e.g., bidding
price, payment requirements, and available time slots). The
same reason holds for the finiteness of the feedback space,
since feedback usually takes discrete values (e.g., number of
clicks, ratings, and number of reviews) as well. Second, we
assume there is a deterministic function that generates the
feedback for a given agent i based on the behaviors of all the
agents and the random arrival of the users. This assumption
is also reasonable because the feedback is usually provided
by the platform using a deterministic algorithm.
With the above assumptions, now let us describe the
generation process of the agent behavior according to
(He et al. 2013). Suppose there are N agents. Let B and H
be the behavior space and feedback space of a single agent
respectively, and U be the random factor space induced by
users. We use the mapping ηi : U×BN → H to denote the
deterministic function that generates the feedback for agent
i, and η : U×BN → HN to denote the joint feedback for
all the agents. At the beginning of the (t +1)-th time period,
agent i receives feedback hit = ηi(ut ,bt) about his/her behav-
iors in the t-th time period. Based on the feedback, agent i
may change his/her behavior to bit+1 in order to be better off.
That is, given the Markov property,
P(bit+1|b1, ...,bt ;u1, ...,ut) = P(bit+1|bit ;hit). (1)
Note that the above equation implies the one-step Markov
property, which is motivated here mainly due to ease of
statement. Our analysis in this paper can be extended to
higher order Markov chain as well, without too many modi-
fications.
Given the feedback ht , all the agents change their behav-
iors independently, so we have
P(bt+1|b1, ...,bt ;u1, ...,ut) =
N
∏
i=1
P(bit+1|b
i
t ;hit) = P(bt+1|bt ,ht).
(2)
This indicates that {bt} is a MCRE (Cogburn 1980), where
the environmental process is {ht}. According to (2), the one-
step transition matrix of an MCRE is time-variant and de-
pends on the environmental variable.
2.2 Learning Agent Behavior Model
There exist some related works that leverage the empiri-
cal risk minimization (ERM) framework to learn the agent
behavior model. Mathematically speaking, given a train-
ing set containing the behaviors of agents and the feedback
they received in T rounds, {(h1,b1) ;(h2,b2) ; ...;(hT ,bT )},
one aims to learn a function f : HN × BN → BN , which
takes the behaviors and feedback at the current round as
inputs and predicts the behavior at the next round. To this
end, one minimizes the empirical risk on the training set:
min f∈F ∑Tt=1 l ( f (ht ,bt) ;bt+1), where l measures the loss
between the predicted behavior and the real behavior in the
training data. For example, l can be the 0− 1 classification
loss: l ( f (bt ,ht) ;bt+1) = 1 f (ht ,bt) 6=bt+1 , and can also be some
surrogate loss functions.
This ERM framework covers the algorithms for predict-
ing advertiser behaviors in many previous works includ-
ing (He et al. 2013) and (Xu et al. 2013). For example, in
(He et al. 2013), a truncated Gaussian function is used to
model the Markov transition probabilities and a negative
likelihood function is used as the loss function l. For another
example, in (Xu et al. 2013), a compound function that con-
siders the willingness, capability, and constraint of an adver-
tiser is used as the model f , and again the negative likelihood
of the historical behaviors is used as the loss function f .
As mentioned in the introduction, the ERM algorithms
led to experimental success in the ABP tasks. However, it
is unclear whether these algorithms have desired theoreti-
cal guarantee. In particular, it is unknown (1) qualitatively
whether the ABP problem is learnable through an ERM pro-
cess, and (2) quantitatively what is the relationship between
generalization error and the size of the training data. The rea-
son why the answers to these important questions are miss-
ing lies in that statistical learning theory mainly addresses
learning problems with data generated by an i.i.d. sampling
or a β -mixing Markov chain. This motivates us to formally
study the learning theory with respect to the data generated
by more complicated stochastic processes like MCRE.
3 Generalization Bounds for ABP
In this section, we perform generalization analysis on the
ERM algorithms for agent behavior prediction. Our main re-
sult is stated in Theorem (3.7). We prove the theorem in three
steps: (1) constructing a new Markov chain of higher dimen-
sionality but with more regular properties than the original
MCRE; (2) proving the convergence of the empirical loss to
the expected loss when the data are generated by this new
Markov chain; (3) proving a uniform convergence bound by
further leveraging the techniques of covering number. For
ease of reference, we use a Notation Table 1 in the end of
the paper to summarize all new notations used in this sec-
tion.
3.1 Constructing a Higher-Dimensional Markov
Chain
The difficulty of analyzing the ERM algorithms when the
data are generated by an MCRE lies in its time-variant tran-
sition probabilities. To tackle the challenge, we construct
a higher-dimensional chain M = {(ht ,bt ,bt+1) ;t ≥ 0}, by
grouping correlated variables together. Let Mk(m,n) be one-
step transition probability of {bt} from state m to n under the
environment k. For convenience, we set zt = (ht ,bt ,bt+1) to
be the t-th state of M. Since the state space HN ×B2N of the
chain is finite, we label all the state values as 1,2...Z, i.e., M
takes value in state space [Z] := {1,2, ...,Z}.
The following Lemma (3.1) and Theorem (3.2) show that
the new Markov chain is time-homogeneous and has a sta-
tionary distribution under some mild assumptions.
Lemma 3.1 We assume the random factors caused by users
ut are i.i.d., then the constructed Markov chain M =
{(ht ,bt ,bt+1) ;t ≥ 0} is time-homogeneous.
Proof Since both feedback space and behavior space are
finite, the set of their three dimensional Cartesian product
values is also finite.
To show that the process is a time-homogeneous Markov
chain, we consider any two states ( j, p,q),(k,m,n) ∈ HN ×
B
2N and write their one-step transition probability as:
P(ht = k,bt = m,bt+1 = n|
(hs,bs,bs+1)t−2s=1; ht−1 = j,bt−1 = p,bt = q)
=P(ht = k,bt = m,bt+1 = n|ht−1 = j,bt−1 = p,bt = q)
=
{
0 for m 6= q
P(u ∈ U : η(u,m) = k)Mk(m,n) for m = q
(3)
From (3), we know that the value of (ht ,bt ,bt+1) only de-
pends on (ht−1,bt−1,bt). Therefore the process is a Markov
chain. Furthermore, the one-step transition probability only
depends on the states ( j, p,q),(k,m,n) and is independent
of time index t, and therefore the transition probability is
time-invariant.
For ease of statement, we will use M to denote the proba-
bility transition matrix in (3). As we can see from (3), lots of
elements in M are zero. Therefore it is not straightforward to
judge whether Markov chain M will converge or not. Theo-
rem (3.2) shows that under some mild assumptions the con-
vergence can be achieved.
Theorem 3.2 The Markov chain M composed by {zt}Tt=1 :=
{ht ,bt ,bt+1}Tt=1 has a stationary distribution under the fol-
lowing assumptions: (A.1) for every fixed value of the feed-
back ht = k, the Markov process with transition matrix Mk is
irreducible and aperiodic; (A.2) the feedback function η and
the random user distribution satisfy ∀m∈B,k∈H,P(u∈U :
η(u,m) = k)> 0. 1
1Condition (A.2), which seems not very intuitive, basically says
that every possible value of the feedback is reachable from every
value of the behavior, if there are a very large number of random
users arriving at the platform and they have very high dynamics
and variety.
To prove this theorem, since the state of (ht ,bt ,bt+1) is
finite and M is time-homogeneous, we only need to prove
that Markov chain M is irreducible and aperiodic, which is
shown in the following two lemmas respectively.
Lemma 3.3 Under the assumption (A.1) and (A.2), the
Markov chain M is irreducible.
Proof According to the definition of irreducibility, we need
to show that any two states (k,m,n) ∈ HN × B2N and
( j, p,q) ∈ HN ×B2N are accessible to each other. To prove
that, we show three simple facts in the following:
• According to assumption (A.2), it is possible to produce
feedback signals k by a one step transition from state
( j, p,q). i.e. ∃x ∈ B,s.t.P(zt+1 = (k,q,x)|zt = ( j, p,q)) >
0.
• In Markov chain Mk where the feedback signal is fixed to
be k, there exists d ∈ {1,2, · · ·}, such that we can build a
d-step transition path from behavior profile x to behavior
profile m, followed by a one step transition to behavior
profile n.
The existence of the d-step path from q to m is due to the
irreducibility of Mk in assumption (A.1). To see that it is
possible to transit from state m to n by one step in Markov
chain Mk, note that if Mk(m,n) = 0, we can simply erase
the state (k,m,n) from the state space of Markov chainM,
which does not affect our results, therefore we only need
to consider the case in which Mk(m,n)> 0.
• According to assumtion (A.2), in Marokov chain M, it is
possible to observe d + 1 consecutive states in which the
d+ 1 feedback signals are all k.
Combining the three points, we can obtain:
P(zt+d+2 = (k,m,n)|zt = ( j, p,q))
≥P(zt+d+2 = (k,m,n)|zt+1 = (k,q,x))
×P(zt+1 = (k,q,x)|zt = ( j, p,q))
=Mk(m,n) ·P(u ∈ U : η(u,m) = k)
×·· ·×Mk(q,x) ·P(u ∈ U : η(u,q) = k)
>0.
(4)
Therefore state (k,m,n) is reachable from state ( j, p,q).
Similarly, we can also prove that state ( j, p,q) is reachable
from state (k,m,n). Since (k,m,n) and ( j, p,q) are arbitrar-
ily chosen, we actually prove the irreducibility of the Markov
chain M.
Lemma 3.4 Under the assumption (A.1) and (A.2), the
Markov chain M is aperiodic.
Proof Since the Markov chain is irreducible, all states in
the chain have the same period. Therefore, in order to prove
the aperiodicity, we just need to show that for a given state
(k,m,m)∈HN×B2N , its period is one. According to the first
assumption in the lemma, ∀d ≥ 1 satisfying M(d)k (m,m) >
0. Therefore we can build a d-step path in Markov chain
Mk: m → m1 → m2 · · · → md−1 → m, such that the transi-
tion probability in every step is positive, i.e., Mk(m,m1) >
0, Mk(m1,m2)> 0, ..., Mk(md−1,m)> 0. As a result,
P(zt+d = (k,m,m)|zt = (k,m,m))
≥P(zt+d = (k,m,m)|zt+d−1 = (k,md−1,m))
×P(zt+d−1 = (k,md−1,m)|zt+d−2 = (k,md−2,md−1))
×·· ·×P(zt+1 = (k,m,m1)|zt = (k,m,m))
=Mk(md−1,m) ·P(u ∈ U : η(u,md−1) = k)
×Mk(md−2,md−1) ·P(u ∈ U : η(u,md−2) = k)
×·· ·×Mk(m,m1) ·P(u ∈ U : η(u,m) = k)
>0.
(5)
Hence, a d-step transition path with positive probability
in Markov chain M can be built as (k,m,m)→ (k,m,m1)→
(k,m1,m2) · · · → (k,md−1,m)→ (k,m,m). Then by the defi-
nition of period 2, Markov chain M has the same period as
Markov chain Mk, which is one.
3.2 Convergence Bound
In the previous subsection, we have constructed a new
Markov chain and proved its convergence. In this subsec-
tion, we show that these results can be used to analyze the
convergence rate of the empirical risk for a specified behav-
ior prediction model, namely f .
Let us start from a formal definition of
the problem. Given the T -round training data
S = {(h1,b1,b2);(h2,b2,b3); · · · ;(hT ,bT ,bT+1)} =
(z1,z2, · · · ,zT ), we define the T -round empirical risk
of f with respect to S as follows:
errTS ( f ) =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
l( f (bt ,ht),bt+1) = 1T
T
∑
t=1
l( f ,zt ), (6)
where we assume l to be upper bounded by a constant B> 0.
Since the Markov chain {zt} is ergodic, we assume that it
is a stationary Markov chain with unique stationary distribu-
tion pi . Then the expected risk of f is
errpi( f ) = Epi l( f ,z) = 1T
T
∑
t=1
Epi l( f ,zt ). (7)
We refer to errpi( f ) as the real expected risk of f .
Next we investigate how well the T -round empirical risk
errTS ( f ) approximates errpi( f ). For this purpose, we lever-
age the Hoeffding Inequality for uniformly ergodic Markov
Chains (Glynn and Ormoneit 2002), which is rephrased as
below for completeness.
Proposition 3.5 (Hoeffding Inequality for uniformly er-
godic Markov Chains) Let X = (Xn : n ≥ 0) be a Markov
Chain taking values in a state space S, if the following as-
sumption holds: (A.3) there exists a probability measure φ
on S, λ > 0, and an integer m ≥ 1 s.t. ∀x ∈ S, P(Xm ∈
·|X0 = x) ≥ λ φ(·), then for a function g : S → R with
its norm defined as ||g|| = sup{|g(x)| : x ∈ S} < ∞, define
ST = 1T ∑Tt=1 g(Xt), for T > 2||g||m/(λ ε), we have
P(|ST −E(ST )| ≥ ε)≤ 2exp(−
λ 2(T ε −2||g||m/λ )2
2T ||g||2m2
), (8)
2In Markov chain P, state i’s period is defined as the g.c.d. of
all d ∈ 1,2, · · · satisfying P(d)(i, i)> 0.
where the expectation E(ST ) is taken on the stationary dis-
tribution of X.
In order to leverage Proposition (3.5), we need to check
whether its assumption (A.3) holds in our problem. For this
purpose, we note the fact that for an irreducible, aperiodic,
and finite-state Markov chain with time-invariant transition
probability matrix P, there must exist N such that ∀n ≥ N,
all elements of n-step transition matrix P(n) are non-zero(
Lemma 6.6.3 in (Durrett 2010) ). Accordingly in our setting,
for Markov chain M, there exists N0 such that ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤
Z,M(N0)i, j > 0. Denote δ as the minimum element in M(N0),
i.e., δ = min
1≤i, j≤Z
M(N0)i, j > 0. Then if we set m = N0, λ = Zδ
and set φ to be the uniform distribution on [Z], it is easy to
see that (A.3) holds. Further noticing that ||g|| in (8) is B
in our setting, where g = l( f ;zt ) and B is the upperbound
of function l, we can leverage Proposition (3.5) to obtain
desired convergence bound as Theorem (3.6) shows.
Theorem 3.6 Convergence of Empirical Loss to Expected
Loss Let f :HN×BN →BN be the behavior prediction func-
tion, errTS ( f ) and errpi( f ) be the empirical loss and expected
loss respectively, as defined in equation (6) and (7). For any
ε > 0 and T > 2BN0/(Zδε), we have
P(
∣∣∣errTS ( f )−errpi ( f )∣∣∣≥ ε)≤ 2exp
(
−
Z2δ 2 (T ε −2BN0/(Zδ ))2
2T B2N20
)
(9)
Theorem (3.6) basically states that when the sample size T is
large enough, the empirical risk errTS ( f ) will converge to the
long-term expected risk errpi ( f ), and the convergence rate is
exponential in the sample size.
3.3 Uniform Convergence Bound
Considering that uniform ergodic Markov chains are β -
mixing (Doob 1953), in this subsection, we prove a uni-
form convergence bound for the ABP problem based on
the independent block technique for β -mixing sequences
(Yu 1994b) and covering number technique3 The indepen-
dent block technique transforms the original problem based
on dependent samples to that based on independent blocks.
Then, we are able to apply the symmetrization technique and
Hoeffding inequality to obtain the desirable bound as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7 Uniform Convergence Theorem. Let F =
{ f : HN ×BN → BN} be the behavior function space and
l ◦F be the composite function set of the loss function l act-
ing on F . For a behavior function f ∈ F , denote errTS ( f )
and errpi( f ) as its empirical loss and expected loss respec-
tively, as defined in equation (6) and (7). For any ε > 0,
3Covering number is one of the common ways to measure
the complexity of a function class. Specifically, covering number
N (ε, l ◦F ,T ) is defined as max
{zt}Tt=1∈[Z]T
N (ε, l ◦F |{zt}Tt=1 ,dT ) in
which N (ε, l ◦F |{zt}Tt=1 ,dT ) is the minimum capacity of ε-cover
of (l ◦F )’s projection on data {zt}Tt=1, w.r.t. the distance metric
between x ∈ RT ,y ∈ RT defined as dT (x,y) := max
1≤t≤T
|xt −yt |.
m ∈ N+, τ ∈ N+, with 2τm = T , we have
P
(
sup
f∈F
|errTS ( f )−errpi ( f )| ≥ ε
)
≤16N (ε/16, l ◦F ,T )exp(− ε
2τ
128B2
)+2τβ (z,m)
(10)
where B is the upper bound of loss function l( f ,z), and
β (z,m) is the β -mixing rate of {zt}.
The proof of the theorem contains two steps. For the first
step, we employ the independent block technique to trans-
form the original problem based on dependent samples to
that based on independent blocks. For the second step, we
further apply the symmetrization technique and Hoeffding
inequality to obtain the desirable bound.
Proof Divide {zt} into 2τ blocks, each of which consists of
m consecutive samples. For 1 ≤ j ≤ τ , we define the time
index sets H j = {t : 2( j − 1)m + 1 ≤ t ≤ (2 j − 1)m} and
Tj = {t : (2 j− 1)m+ 1 ≤ t ≤ (2 j)m}. We introduce i.i.d.
blocks {z˜t : t ∈H j}, and they have the same distribution with
{zt : t ∈ H1}. Then we have,
P
(
sup
f∈F
|errTS ( f )− errpi( f )| ≥ ε
)
≤2P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
(
∑
t∈H j
l( f ,zt )−E ∑
t∈H j
l( f ,zt )
)
| ≥ mε
)
≤2P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
(
∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t )−E ∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t )
)
| ≥ mε
)
+ 2τβ (z,m)
(11)
Since {∑t∈H j l( f , z˜t}τj=1 are i.i.d., we can apply the sym-
metrization technique by introducing i.i.d. ghost samples
{zˆt : t ∈ H j}, we have
P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
(
∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t )−E ∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t )
)
| ≥ mε
)
≤2P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t )− 1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
∑
t∈H j
l( f , zˆt )| ≥ mε/2
)
(12)
Now we introduce Rademacher variables {σ j}τj=1, which
are i.i.d., and satisfying P(σ j =±1)= 1/2, j = 1, ...,τ. Then
we have
P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t )− 1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
∑
t∈H j
l( f , zˆt )| ≥ mε/2
)
=P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
σ j( ∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t )− ∑
t∈H j
l( f , zˆt ))| ≥ mε/2
)
≤2P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
σ j( ∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t ))| ≥ mε/4
)
(13)
We use the covering number technique and hoeffding in-
equality to obtain our desirable results. Pick a subset G ⊆F
such that l ◦ G is an ε/16-cover of l ◦F with respect to
l∞ metric dT (l ◦ f1, l ◦ f2) := max
1≤t≤T
|l( f1,zt )− l( f2,zt )|. Then
we have
P
(
sup
f∈F
|
1
τ
τ
∑
j=1
σ j( ∑
t∈H j
l( f , z˜t ))| ≥ mε/4
)
≤2N (ε/16, l ◦F ,T )exp(− ε
2τ
128B2 )
(14)
Therefore by combining these inequalities (11), (12), (13)
and (14), we obtain
P
(
sup
f∈F
|errTS ( f )− errpi( f )| ≥ ε
)
≤16N (ε/16, l ◦F ,T )exp(− ε
2τ
128B2 )+ 2τβ (z,m)
(15)
Remark: Please note that for most regular function class,
the covering number N (ε, l ◦F ,T ) defined in Theorem 3.7
can be polynomially bounded. For example,
• If the loss function l is Lipschitz-continuous in its first
argument with Lipschitz constant L > 0, then for any T ,
we have N (ε, l ◦F ,T )≤N (ε/L,F ,T ).
• Since we assume the behavior set to be finite, the
ABP problem can actually be regarded as a multi-class
classification problem, where the class number is |B|.
In this case, the covering number N ( ε8/L,F ,2T ) can
be bounded by the growth function of F , defined as
max
{zt}Tt=1∈[Z]2T
∣∣F |{zt}2Tt=1∣∣. Moreover, the growth function is
bounded by ( 2Te(|B|+1)
2
2d )
d (Bendavid et al. 1995), where
d is the Natarajan dimension of F (Natarajan 1989). Thus
N ( ε8/L,F ,2T ) is at most in T ’s polynomial order.
One may note that the value of m affects the bound stated
in Theorem (3.7). The following corollary shows how to set
the value of m when {zt} forms an algebraically mixing pro-
cess.
Corollary 3.8 If {zt} forms an algebraically mixing se-
quence, i.e., β (z,m) ≤ β0m−γ , where β0,γ ≥ 0, then the op-
timal value of m is given by m =C(T 11+s ), where 0 < s < γ .
For any ε > 0, the uniform convergence bound becomes:
P
(
sup
f∈F
|errTS ( f )− errpi( f )| ≥ ε
)
≤16N (ε/16, l ◦F ,T )exp(− ε
2
256B2C T
s
1+s )+β0C−(r+1)T s−γ1+s
(16)
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have studied the generalization ability of
ERM algorithms for agent behavior prediction. In particu-
lar, we first develop a new technique that transforms MCRE
to a higher-dimensional but more regular Markov chain and
then give a uniform generalization bound based on the new
Markov chain. As for the future work, we plan to investi-
gate the joint learning problem of the optimal mechanism of
the platform and the optimal prediction model of agent be-
haviors. Generalization analyses for these two cases will be
even more challenging, and the corresponding results will
also have more profound impact on adopting machine learn-
ing techniques in real-world interactive systems.
Notation Meaning
U,B,H Respectively the random user factors
space, agent behavior space and feedback
space
ut ,bt ,ht Respectively the random users, agents
joint behavior and feedback at round t
N Number of agents in the system
η Feedback function outputting feedbacks
to all agents. η maps from U×BN to HN
Mk Agents joint behavior transition probabil-
ity matrix under joint feedback k
M The new construocted higher dimensional
chain, M= {(ht ,bt ,bt+1) ;t ≥ 0}
Z M’s state number. We assume that M
takes states from [Z] = {1,2, ...,Z}
zt M′’s state value at round t, zt =
{ht ,bt ,bt+1}
M Transition probability matrix of M
pi M’s stationary distribution
N0 The elements of N0-step transition proba-
bility matrix M(N0) of M are all positive
δ Minimum element of M(N0)
F Function class of behavior prediction
functions, F ⊂ { f : HN ×BN → BN}
l Loss function w.r.t. behavior prediction
function f and data, e.g, l( f ,zt) =
1 f (ht ,bt ) 6=bt+1
B Upper bound for loss function l
S, ˜S T -round training data and ghost data sam-
pled from M respectively, S=(zt)Tt=1, ˜S=
(z˜t)Tt=1
errTS ( f ), errpi ( f ) Respectively denotes the T -round empiri-
cal loss on S and expected loss of an agent
behavior prediction function f
Table 1: Notations
5 Acknowledgement
This work is partially supported by grant from the National
Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars of
China (Grant No. 61325010). We thank Di He for his valu-
able suggestions on the detailed proof technique. Thanks to
the AAAI anonymous reviewers for their comments to make
the paper more exact and clear.
References
[Bendavid et al. 1995] Bendavid, S.; Cesabianchi, N.; Haus-
sler, D.; and Long, P. M. 1995. Characterizations of learn-
ability for classes of (0,..., n)-valued functions. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences 50(1):74–86.
[Cary et al. 2007] Cary, M.; Das, A.; Edelman, B.; Giotis, I.;
Heimerl, K.; Karlin, A. R.; Mathieu, C.; and Schwarz., M.
2007. Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions. In EC
’07 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic
commerce. ACM Press.
[Chakrabarty, Zhou, and Lukose. 2007] Chakrabarty, D.;
Zhou, Y.; and Lukose., R. 2007. Budget constrained bidding
in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems. In
WWW ’07 Proceedings of the 16th international conference
on World Wide Web. ACM Press.
[Cogburn 1980] Cogburn, R. 1980. Markov chains in ran-
dom environments: the case of markovian environments.
The Annals of Probability 908–916.
[Cogburn 1984] Cogburn, R. 1984. The ergodic theory
of markov chains in random environments. Zeitschrift
fu¨r Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und verwandte Gebiete
66(1):109–128.
[Cogburn 1991] Cogburn, R. 1991. On the central limit theo-
rem for markov chains in random environments. The Annals
of Probability 19(2):587–604.
[Cui et al. 2011] Cui, Y.; Zhang, R.; Li, W.; and Mao., J.
2011. Bid landscape forecasting in online ad exchange
marketplace. In KDD ’11 Proceedings of the 17th ACM
SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery
and data mining. ACM Press.
[Devroye 1996] Devroye, L. 1996. A probabilistic theory of
pattern recognition, volume 31. springer.
[Doob 1953] Doob, J. 1953. Stochastic Processes. Wiley
Publications in Statistics. John Wiley & Sons.
[Durrett 2010] Durrett, R. 2010. Probability: theory and ex-
amples, volume 3. Cambridge university press.
[Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz 2005] Edelman, B.; Os-
trovsky, M.; and Schwarz, M. 2005. Internet advertising
and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of
dollars worth of keywords. Technical report, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
[Glynn and Ormoneit 2002] Glynn, P. W., and Ormoneit, D.
2002. Hoeffding’s inequality for uniformly ergodic markov
chains. Statistics & probability letters 56(2):143–146.
[He et al. 2013] He, D.; Chen, W.; Wang, L.; and Liu, T.-Y.
2013. A game-theoretic machine learning approach for rev-
enue maximization in sponsored search.
[Mohri and Rostamizadeh 2007] Mohri, M., and Ros-
tamizadeh, A. 2007. Stability bounds for non-iid processes.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
1025–1032.
[Natarajan 1989] Natarajan, B. K. 1989. On learning sets
and functions. Machine Learning 4(1):67–97.
[Pin and Key. 2011] Pin, F., and Key., P. 2011. Stochasitic
variability in sponsored search auctions: Observations and
models. In EC ’11 Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference
on Electronic commerce. ACM Press.
[Vapnik 1998] Vapnik, V. N. 1998. Statistical learning the-
ory.
[Vidyasagar 2003] Vidyasagar, M. 2003. Learning and gen-
eralization: with applications to neural networks. Springer.
[Xu et al. 2013] Xu, H.; Gao, B.; Yang, D.; and Liu, T.-Y.
2013. Predicting advertiser bidding behaviors in sponsored
search by rationality modeling. In Proceedings of the 22nd
international conference on World Wide Web, 1433–1444.
International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Com-
mittee.
[Yu 1994a] Yu, B. 1994a. Rates of convergence for empirical
processes of stationary mixing sequences. The Annals of
Probability 94–116.
[Yu 1994b] Yu, B. 1994b. Rates of convergence for empirical
processes of stationary mixing sequences. The Annals of
Probability 94–116.
[Zhang and Tao 2012] Zhang, C., and Tao, D. 2012. Gen-
eralization bounds of erm-based learning processes for
continuous-time markov chains. IEEE Trans. Neural Netw.
Learning Syst. 1872–1883.
[Zhou and Lukose. 2007] Zhou, Y., and Lukose., R. 2007.
Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions. In ICEC ’07 Pro-
ceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic
commerce. ACM Press.
[Zou, Li, and Xu 2009] Zou, B.; Li, L.; and Xu, Z. 2009. The
generalization performance of erm algorithm with strongly
mixing observations. Mach. Learn. 75(3):275–295.
